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“As we all know, lax lending practices earlier in this 
decade led to irresponsible lending and irresponsible 
borrowing.  This simply put too many families into 
mortgages they could not afford.”—Henry Paulson, 74th 
Secretary of the Treasury.1 
 
 †     J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2012; B.A., Applied 
Economics, cum laude, The College of Saint Scholastica, 2007. 
 1. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Statement by Secretary Henry 
M. Paulson, Jr. on Comprehensive Approach to Market Developments (Sept. 19, 
2008), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1149.htm. 
1
Fuchihara: Contracts: A Million Dollar Mistake—Business Bank v. Hanson
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2010
  
2010] BUSINESS BANK V. HANSON 299 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, there were a 
multitude of ways for borrowers to secure cheap mortgages.2  Many 
borrowers and lenders took advantage of this situation and hastily 
executed mortgages which, in hindsight, were not in the best 
interests of either party.3  One of those mortgages made its way to 
the Minnesota Supreme Court, which proved unwilling to remedy 
the poorly researched decisions of mortgage lenders.4 
In the recent decision Business Bank v. Hanson, 5 the Minnesota 
Supreme Court examined the question of whether a mortgage 
securing only a portion of a note was invalid for noncompliance 
with Minnesota’s Mortgage Registry Tax statute.6  A subsequent 
lender holding a mortgage securing a note in excess of $1.08 
million invoked the statute to argue that the prior mortgage was 
invalid.7  The court focused on the plain language of the prior 
mortgage and held that because the mortgage explicitly stated the 
amount of debt it was intended to secure, the owner of the prior 
mortgage had priority over the subsequent lender.8  By forcing the 
later lender to bear the consequences of improperly conducting a 
title search and granting a mortgage to a risky borrower, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court reinforced the proposition that 
companies who negligently or carelessly assess applicants do so at 
their own peril.9 
 
 
 
 2. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis 
of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 549, 562–63 (2009); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Future of 
Securitization, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1313, 1317 n.10 (2009) (noting availability of 
subprime mortgages to all types of borrowers). 
 3. See generally Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Law and Economic Issues in Subprime 
Litigation, in THE HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES 1 (2008), http://
www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ferrell_et_al_612.pdf 
(exploring explores the economic and legal causes and consequences of recent 
difficulties in the subprime mortgage market). 
 4. See Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285 (Minn. 2009). 
 5. Id. 
 6. See id.  Minnesota’s Mortgage Registration Tax is codified in Minnesota 
Statutes §§ 287.01–.39 (2008). 
 7. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287. 
 8. Id. at 289. 
 9. See infra notes 185–87 
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This case note first discusses the history of Minnesota case law 
surrounding the Mortgage Registry Tax statute.10  Next, it discusses 
the facts and analysis of the Business Bank decision.11  Last, this case 
note concludes that the court not only reached the correct result, it 
also prevented unnecessary litigation, dissuaded lenders from 
engaging in unsound business practices, and upheld freedom to 
contract.12 
II. HISTORY 
A. Minnesota Case Law 
“A mortgage upon real estate, . . . while in form a conveyance 
of an estate or interest in land, in its purpose and effect, is a mere 
lien or security . . .” on the mortgaged premises.13  It simply creates 
a lien enforceable by foreclosure.14  The lien lasts as long as the 
debt.15 
Generally, the validity of a mortgage depends upon whether it 
provides “reasonable notice” to third parties of the obligation that 
it creates.16  “The execution of mortgages is generally subject [to] 
statutory regulation.”17 
Minnesota has recognized for over a hundred years that the 
amount owed on a note and the amount secured by a mortgage 
may be different,18 and that mortgage security does not extend 
beyond the definite sum provided in the mortgage instrument.19 
 
 10. See infra Part II. 
 11. See infra Parts III, IV. 
 12. See infra Part V. 
 13. S.R.A., Inc. v. State, 213 Minn. 487, 488, 7 N.W.2d 484, 485 (1943); see also 
Ayer v. Stewart, 14 Minn. 97, 98 (1869) (McMillan, J., dissenting). 
 14. Browning v. Browning, 246 Minn. 327, 334, 76 N.W.2d 100, 105 (1956). 
 15. Geib v. Reynolds, 35 Minn. 331, 335, 28 N.W. 923, 924 (1886); Folsom v. 
Lockwood, 6 Minn. 186, 190 (1861); Whittacre v. Fuller, 5 Minn. 508, 517 (1861) 
(“[A] mortgage being given as security for a debt, and not merely for any particular 
evidence of debt, the general rule is, that nothing but actual payment of the debt, or 
an express release will operate as a discharge of the mortgage.  The lien lasts as 
long as the debt.”) (emphasis added)). 
 16. 54A AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 11 (2009); see also Conn. Nat. Bank v. 
Esposito, 554 A.2d 735, 738 (Conn. 1989) (“The purpose of such ‘reasonable 
notice’ is to prevent parties that are not privy to the transaction from being 
defrauded or misled.”). 
 17. 54A AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 10 (2009). 
 18. See Winne v. Lahart, 155 Minn. 307, 309–10, 193 N.W. 587, 588–89 
(1923); Kingsley v. Anderson, 103 Minn. 510, 511, 115 N.W. 642, 643 (1908). 
 19. 31 DUNNELL MINN. DIGEST MORTGAGES § 1.07 (5th ed. 2009); see Kingsley, 
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Minnesota law also provides that a mortgage can secure several 
notes.20  When several notes are secured by the same mortgage, it 
continues as security for all of them in the absence of an agreement 
to the contrary.21 
B. The Mortgage Registry Tax Statute and its Revenue Generating 
Purpose 
Among other statutory provisions,22 mortgages in Minnesota 
are subject to the Mortgage Registry Tax statute.23  Originally 
passed in 1907, the statute was enacted “to provide for the taxation 
of mortgages of real property.”24 
Shortly after enactment, disputes began to arise concerning 
the validity of mortgages that were not in strict compliance with the 
statute.25  In 1913, the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed the 
question in First State Bank of Boyd v. Hayden.26 
In Hayden, the court stated that “[t]he statute is purely a 
revenue measure, and we find nothing therein to indicate that it 
was the legislative intent to declare instruments void for 
noncompliance therewith.”27  Instead of completely invalidating a 
 
103 Minn. at 511, 115 N.W. at 643 (“[A] mortgage securing a note stated to be for 
a definite sum, when in fact the note is for a larger sum, is security only for the 
smaller sum stated in the mortgage.”). 
 20. Mut. Trust Life Ins. Co. v. Ecklund Bldg. Co., 180 Minn. 544, 547, 231 
N.W. 207, 208 (1930); see Wilson v. Eigenbroht, 30 Minn. 4, 6, 13 N.W. 907, 907 
(1882). 
 21. Mut. Trust Life Ins. Co., 180 Minn. at 547, 231 N.W. at 208; see Hall v. Hall, 
31 Minn. 280, 282, 17 N.W. 620, 620 (1883); Wilson, 30 Minn. at 5, 13 N.W. at 907. 
 22. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 507.24, subdiv. 1 (2008) (detailing the 
requirements of a valid mortgage recordation); MINN. STAT. § 507.40 (2008) 
(specifying how mortgages are properly discharged). 
 23. MINN. STAT. §§ 287.01–.39 (2008).  The statute provides that the 
mortgagor, or borrower in the mortgage agreement, must pay a tax on the 
privilege of recording a mortgage.  Id. § 287.035. 
 24. An Act to Provide for the Taxation of Mortgages of Real Property, ch. 
328, 1907 Minn. Laws. 448 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 287.01 (2008)); see also 
McGovern v. Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul, 209 Minn. 403, 404, 296 N.W. 473, 474 
(1941) (“[Minnesota’s] mortgage registry tax is a revenue measure.”). 
 25. See infra notes 26–35 and accompanying text.  The supreme court was also 
called to address the constitutionality of the statute shortly after enactment.  The 
court upheld the constitutionality of the tax, and stated that it must be applied 
uniformly to all property belonging to the same tax class.  See Mut. Benefit Ins. Co. 
v. Cnty. of Marin, 104 Minn. 179, 181–83, 116 N.W. 572, 573–74 (1908). 
 26. 121 Minn. 45, 140 N.W. 132 (1913). 
 27. Id. at 47, 140 N.W.2d at 134.  The court also explained that “[t]he 
contract itself comes into existence through the contractual acts of the parties and 
exists as such without reference to the statute . . . .”  Id., 140 N.W.2d at 134. 
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mortgage, the court held that nonpayment of taxes under the 
statute created a state of dormancy whereby enforcement of the 
mortgage is delayed until performance of the statutory conditions 
are satisfied.28 
Later in 1913, the supreme court was again asked to clarify the 
effect of the Mortgage Registry Tax statute on the operation of 
mortgages in Staples v. East St. Paul State Bank.29  The security 
instrument in Staples was facially deficient, and the creditor asked 
the district court to reform it so as to cure the deficiency.30  In 
particular, the court discussed and analyzed a provision similar to 
the one in force today: “No instrument relating to real estate shall 
be valid as security for any debt, unless the fact that it is so intended 
and the amount of such debt are expressed therein.”31 
The court held that reformation of a mortgage was permitted, 
noting that the statute’s provisions “were not intended to change 
the law of contracts, except in so far as it became necessary to 
prescribe terms to be incorporated which would furnish 
information upon which the proper tax from every transaction 
could be secured.”32  The court determined that, because the 
Mortgage Registry Tax statute was a revenue measure, the deed was 
valid.33 
The court again reiterated the purpose of the statute in 1922 
in deciding Engenmoen v. Lutroe.34  For the third time in less than a 
decade, the court explained the legislative intent of the act: “[t]he 
act is a revenue measure purely, and the only purpose of its 
 
 28. Id., 140 N.W.2d at 134.  (“[T]he legislature, having in mind not only 
recordable contracts but also unacknowledged and hence unrecordable 
instruments, intended to render all contracts within the terms of the act 
unenforceable in or by any legal proceeding until the tax has been paid, whether 
the instrument is recordable or otherwise.”). 
 29. 122 Minn. 419, 142 N.W. 721 (1913). 
 30. Id. at 420–21, 142 N.W.2d at 721. 
 31. Id. at 421, 142 N.W.2d at 722.  At the time the Business Bank decision was 
rendered, the statutory language remained virtually unchanged: “No instrument . . 
. relating to real estate is valid as security for any debt, unless the fact that it is 
intended and the initial known amount of the debt are expressed in it.”  MINN. 
STAT. § 287.03 (2008). 
 32. Staples, 122 Minn. at 422, 142 N.W. at 722.  The supreme court did not 
find it necessary to hold “that where, because of mutual ignorance or mistake, and 
without any intention to evade the tax, the contract giving real estate as security 
for a debt, fails to comply with the statute, it may not be reformed so as to conform 
therewith.”  Id. 
 33. Id., 142 N.W.2d at 722. 
 34. 153 Minn. 409, 190 N.W. 894 (1922). 
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prohibitive provisions is to compel the payment of the prescribed 
tax.”35 
Thus, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that the 
primary function of the Mortgage Registry Tax statute is to 
generate revenue.  It is not intended to modify existing contract 
law, nor should it be invoked as a defense to the formation of an 
otherwise effective instrument that reflects the parties’ intent.  The 
court has consistently rejected attempts to use Minnesota Statutes 
section 287.03 as a means to invalidate mortgages.  The priority of 
interests in real estate is properly determined by the Minnesota 
Recording Act, not the Mortgage Registry Tax statute.36  “Nothing 
in Chapter 287’s language implies that its provisions are intended 
as a tool for determining mortgage validity.”37 
“[P]ractitioners and lenders have long relied on the [supreme 
court’s] consistent holding that the Minnesota Mortgage Registry 
Tax statute is solely a revenue measure, which cannot be used by a 
junior lienholder to subordinate or render unenforceable an 
otherwise valid senior lien so long as the required tax has been 
paid.”38  They continued to do so during the mortgage boom of the 
2000s. 
III. THE BUSINESS BANK DECISION 
A. Facts 
In 2004, Kevin Hanson and Travis Carter formed North 
American Pet Distributors, Inc. (NAPD) to purchase an exotic fish 
wholesaler, U.S. Pet Headquarters, Inc. (U.S. Pet).39  On February 
5, 2004, The Business Bank (Business Bank) loaned NAPD 
$250,000 on a term note to purchase U.S. Pet’s assets.40  Hanson 
and Carter personally guaranteed the note to be repaid in ninety 
 
 35. Id. at 412, 190 N.W.2d at 895–96; see also Mooty v. Union Bond & Mortg. 
Co., 180 Minn. 550, 551, 231 N.W. 406, 407 (1930) (explaining that the law 
requiring payment of registration tax on mortgage is a revenue measure, and 
nonpayment does not make the instrument to which the tax is applicable invalid). 
 36. See MINN. STAT. § 507.34 (2008); see also Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, 
Real Prop. Law Section as Amicus Curiae at 2, Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 
285 (No. A07-1832), 2009 WL 470738 [hereinafter Brief for Minn. State Bar 
Ass’n]. 
 37. Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 36, at 4. 
 38. Id. at 3. 
 39. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Minn. 2009). 
 40. Id. 
6
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days.41  They also assumed an existing $111,925.17 debt which U.S. 
Pet owed Business Bank.42 
On August 17, 2004, Business Bank loaned NAPD an 
additional $50,000 term note and a $100,000 revolving note after 
Hanson and Carter were unable to secure additional financing 
from other sources.43  Business Bank also extended the term on the 
initial $250,000 loan.44 
Business Bank required additional guaranties from Hanson 
and Carter in exchange for the new loans.45  Hanson executed an 
amended and restated guaranty covering the $400,000 in loans to 
NAPD and the $111,925.17 in loans that NAPD assumed in 
acquiring U.S. Pet.46  Hanson and Carter both executed $200,000 
third party mortgages on their respective houses in favor of 
Business Bank; each third party mortgage was recorded in 
Hennepin County on August 31, 2004.47 
In September of 2005, Hanson and Carter, still unable to meet 
their obligations, negotiated a loan modification agreement with 
Business Bank.48  In exchange for an additional $15,000 of debt, 
Hanson and Carter were permitted to extend their time for 
repayment.49  The modification agreement was recorded as an 
amendment to the original mortgages on December 23, 2005.50 
Apparently unrelated to his business operations, Hanson 
sought to refinance his home in October 2005.51  Even though the 
title was encumbered by an $880,000 lien in favor of Chase Bank, in 
addition to the $200,000 Business Bank lien, Hanson executed a 
$1.17 million mortgage on his home in favor of Option One 
Mortgage Corporation (Option One) on October 31, 2005.52  
Option One later contended that their title search did not uncover 
Business Bank’s lien.53 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 286–87. 
 47. Id. at 287. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  Hanson did not list his liabilities to Business Bank on his Option One 
mortgage application because, according to his belief, his liability to Business Bank 
7
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In 2006, Hanson and Carter defaulted on their obligations to 
Business Bank after NAPD ceased operations and liquidated.54  
Business Bank agreed to wait until Hanson satisfied his obligations 
before further pursuing Carter, and in exchange, Carter paid half 
of his debts.55 
Business Bank filed a complaint seeking, among other claims, 
to foreclose on the mortgage on Hanson’s home.56  Business Bank 
joined Option One as a party, claiming their mortgage had priority 
over the lien held by Option One.57 
Both Business Bank and Option One moved for summary 
judgment.58  “Option One argued that the mortgage in favor of 
Business Bank [was] invalid because it [did] not state the amount 
that the mortgage secures,” pursuant to section 287.03 of the 
Minnesota Statutes.59 
The district court, following the case law, granted Business 
Bank’s motion for summary judgment.60  The “court concluded 
that Business Bank’s mortgage had priority over Option One’s 
mortgage [and] ordered foreclosure of Business Bank’s 
mortgage.”61 
B. The Court of Appeals Decision 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed in part the district 
court’s grant of summary judgment, concluding that Business 
Bank’s mortgage did not comply with section 287.03 and was thus 
invalid.62  The statute provides: “No instrument, other than a 
decree of marriage dissolution or an instrument made pursuant to 
it, relating to real estate shall be valid as security for any debt, 
unless the fact that it is intended and the initial known amount of 
 
was corporate and therefore did not have to be disclosed to Option One when he 
applied for refinancing.  The court said Hanson did not need to disclose his 
liabilities to Option One because Business Bank orally agreed to release him from 
all personal obligations while he refinanced his home.  Id. at 287 n.3. 
 54. Id. at 287. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id.  Hanson also sued Business Bank and Carter, and the district court 
consolidated the claims with Business Bank’s action.  Id. at 287 n.4. 
 57. Id. at 287. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 288. 
 62. See Bus. Bank v. Hanson, No. A07-1832, 2008 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 1282, 
at *2 (Oct. 28, 2008). 
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the debt are expressed in it.”63  The court reasoned that the 
meaning of the statute was plain, and it required the instrument to 
state the amount of the entire debt.64  Because the mortgage listed 
that it secured up to $200,000 and not the entire amount of 
approximately $512,000 owed to Business Bank, the court ruled 
that the mortgage did not express “the initial known amount of 
debt” as required by section 287.03.65 
Business Bank cited both Engenmoen and Staples in support of 
the proposition that a mortgage should not be invalidated because 
of noncompliance with the statute.66  The court rejected this 
argument, reasoning that although the cases were germane 
because they concern a statute which was the predecessor to 
section 287.03, they were inapplicable because of the facts and 
procedural posture of the Business Bank case.67 
“In Staples,” the court of appeals reasoned, “the security 
instrument was facially deficient, but the creditor asked the district 
court to reform [the instrument] so as to cure the deficiency.”68  
The district court granted the relief and the supreme court 
affirmed, on grounds that there was “no intent to evade the tax and 
no other improper intent.”69  The court of appeals ruled that 
because “Business Bank did not plead reformation or otherwise 
undertake to reform a concededly invalid mortgage. . . . Staples is 
inapplicable.”70 
The court of appeals explained that Engenmoen  
stand[s] for the proposition that a mortgage that does not 
comply with section 287.03 is invalid unless the 
noncompliance has been cured, such as by filing a proper 
mortgage . . . or by a district court judgment reforming 
the mortgage, in which event the mortgage would have 
priority as though it were proper when filed.71 
 
 
 63. Id. at *20–21 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 287.03 (2006)). 
 64. Id. at *22 (“An instrument securing debt by granting a mortgage to real 
property must state the amount of the entire debt.”). 
 65. Id. at *23 (“[T]he express language of section 287.03 plainly states that a 
mortgage is invalid if it does not state the total amount of debt.”). 
 66. See id. 
 67. Id. at *24. 
 68. Id. (citing Staples v. E. St. Paul State Bank, 122 Minn. 419, 420–21, 142 
N.W. 721, 721 (1913)). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at *25. 
 71. Id. at *26. 
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The court elaborated that “even in the absence of cure, a 
noncompliant mortgage is valid against a third party seeking to 
invalidate the mortgage if the third party had actual notice of all 
facts to which the third party is entitled by the statute.”72 
Because Hanson did not disclose all details relating to his 
obligations to Business Bank, the court determined that Option 
One was not in possession of all the facts to which they were 
entitled by the statute.73  Option One was deemed not to have 
acquired actual notice, making the mortgage invalid because its 
noncompliance with section 287.03 was not cured.74  Hanson 
construed his obligations to Business Bank as “a corporate liability” 
and, thus, “did not inform Option One of the prior mortgage.”75  At 
best, the court of appeals reasoned, “Option One was aware that 
Hanson had granted a mortgage to Business Bank.”76  Because 
Option One was not aware of all the facts to which they were 
entitled by section 287.03, Business Bank’s noncompliance was not 
cured.77  Accordingly, “the court of appeals held that the district 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Business 
Bank and against Option One.”78 
C. The Supreme Court Decision 
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted Business Bank’s 
petition for review, and ruled that Business Bank’s mortgage 
complied with the Mortgage Registry Tax statute, upholding the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Business 
Bank on the issue of mortgage priority.79 
The court noted that Chapter 287 must be read to give effect 
to all provisions,80 and that section 287.05, subdivision 1a(a), 
governing mortgages which secure only a portion of a debt recited 
 
 72. Id. at *27. 
 73. See id. (“The district court stated that Option One had ‘constructive 
notice of prior interest in the property,’ but that statement appears to mean only 
that Option One was aware that Hanson had granted a mortgage to Business 
Bank.  The relevant inquiry, however, is whether Option One knew the ‘initial 
known amount’ of the whole of Hanson’s debt to Business Bank because that is 
the information to which Option One is entitled by section 287.03.”). 
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at *28. 
 79. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 2009). 
 80. MINN. STAT. § 645.17(2) (2008). 
10
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in the mortgage, was dispositive of the question of the validity of 
Business Bank’s mortgage.81  Under that provision, a mortgage may 
state on its first page that “[n]otwithstanding anything to the 
contrary herein, enforcement of this mortgage is limited to a debt 
amount of $____ under chapter 287 of Minnesota Statutes.”82  
When a mortgage contains such a statement, the statute provides 
that “the effect of the mortgage . . . as notice for any purpose in this 
state, shall be limited to the amount contained in the statement.”83 
Business Bank’s mortgage recited the exact statement 
permitted by section 287.05, subdivision 1a(a): “Notwithstanding 
anything to the contrary herein, the maximum principal amount of 
the indebtedness secured by this mortgage is $200,000.”84  The 
mortgage also disclosed that it was intended to secure only a 
portion of the debt Hanson owed Business Bank and that the effect 
of the mortgage was limited to no more than $200,000.85 
The court rejected Option One’s contention that Business 
Bank’s mortgage secured all $511,925 of Hanson’s debt because 
the mortgage provided that it would remain in effect until all of 
Hanson’s debts were satisfied.86  In doing so, the court noted that 
prior Minnesota decisions permitted that the amount owed on a 
note may differ from the amount secured by a mortgage.87  
Although the lien on the property would continue to exist until the 
entire debt was satisfied, the most Business Bank could recover in a 
foreclosure sale would be $200,000.88 
 
 
 81. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 289. 
 82. MINN. STAT. § 287.05, subdiv. 1a(a) (2008). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 289.  The supreme court also stated that “[t]he 
court of appeals reached its conclusion that the mortgage did not set forth the 
amount of debt without discussing this language from the first page of the 
mortgage.”  Id. at 289 n.6. 
 85. Id. at 289. 
 86. Id. at 289–90. 
 87. See Winne v. Lahart, 155 Minn. 307, 309–10, 193 N.W. 587, 588, 588–89 
(1923) (stating “the note and the mortgage are separate and distinct 
instruments”); Kingsley v. Anderson, 103 Minn. 510, 511, 115 N.W. 642, 643 
(1908) (“[A] mortgage securing a note stated to be for a definite sum, when in 
fact the note is for a larger sum, is security only for the smaller sum stated in the 
mortgage.”). 
 88. See Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 289 (“[T]hat Hanson owes Business Bank 
more than $200,000, and that the bank may be able to hold the mortgage until the 
last dollar of those debts is paid, does not mean that more than $200,000 of 
Hanson’s debt is secured by the mortgage.  Nor does it mean that Business Bank 
could collect more than $200,000 by foreclosing its mortgage.”). 
11
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The court also rejected Option One’s position that the 
mortgage provisions create ambiguity in the amount of debt 
secured by the mortgage.89  The clear statement on the first page of 
the mortgage explicitly stated that the maximum amount that the 
mortgage secured was $200,000.90 
The court upheld the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment to Business Bank on the issue of priority between the 
Business Bank mortgage and the Option One mortgage.91 
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS BANK DECISION 
The Business Bank court’s decision interpreted the Mortgage 
Registry Tax statute as well as other relevant Minnesota law to reach 
the proper result.  Its decision was consistent with the court’s 
history of giving great weight to the legislative purpose of the 
Mortgage Registry Tax statute, which was simply to generate 
revenue and not render otherwise valid contracts invalid.92  The 
Mortgage Registry Tax statute is “purely a revenue measure,”93 and 
its only purpose is to ensure that the State of Minnesota collects the 
proper amount of mortgage registry tax.94  This is consistent with 
the general notion that cases where a junior mortgage lienholder is 
elevated above senior lienholder are quite rare.95 
 
 
 89. Id. at 290. 
 90. Id. The first page stated that “the maximum principal amount of the 
indebtedness secured by this mortgage is $200,000.”  Id.  Option One’s 
interpretation would require that provision to be ignored.  Id.  The court noted 
that the mortgage must be read to give effect to all of its provisions.  Id.  (citing 
Metro Airports Comm’n v. Noble, 763 N.W.2d 639, 645 (Minn. 2009)).  In giving 
effect to all provisions of the mortgage, the court determined that the plain and 
unambiguous contract language provided that the maximum amount of debt 
secured by the mortgage was limited to no more than $200,000.  Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. See First State Bank of Boyd v. Hayden, 121 Minn. 45, 50, 140 N.W. 132, 
134 (1913); Staples v. E. St. Paul State Bank, 122 Minn. 419, 422, 142 N.W. 721, 
722 (1913); supra notes 32–35 and accompanying text. 
 93. Hayden, 121 Minn. at 50, 140 N.W. at 134. 
 94. See Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 36, at 10. 
 95. 4C PATRICK J. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCING § 3H.01 (2007) (“Cases in 
which a junior mortgage lien is elevated above the paramount mortgage are the 
exception and not the rule.”); see also Granse & Assoc. v. Kimm, 529 N.W.2d 6, 9 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (stating the general rule of mortgage priority as “first in 
time is first in right.”). 
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A. Decision Promotes Stability and Prevents Unnecessary Litigation 
Real Property Law Section members of the Minnesota State 
Bar Association were undoubtedly relieved by the court’s decision.  
According to the Amicus Curiae brief they submitted with the 
supreme court requesting a reversal of the court of appeals 
decision, a ruling to the contrary would have created wide-ranging 
consequences.96  An affirmance would have invalidated mortgages 
throughout the state and led to inestimable reformation actions.97 
Countless mortgages have been prepared and recorded in 
Minnesota based upon the understanding that the Mortgage 
Registry Tax statute does not affect the validity or enforceability of 
a mortgage so long as the proper tax has been paid.98  It has long 
been common for real estate lawyers and lenders to do exactly as 
Business Bank did, stating on the face of a mortgage only the dollar 
amount secured by the mortgage lien and not the total amount of 
the indebtedness.99  An affirmance by the court would have 
subordinated or rendered unenforceable numerous otherwise valid 
mortgages.100  Lenders holding such mortgages would have been 
forced to pursue immediate reformation actions for fear of 
invalidation by third parties.101  Junior lienholders could have 
received a windfall, even if they granted their liens with knowledge 
of other encumbrances.102 
By ruling in favor of Business Bank, the supreme court 
ensured stability in the validity of mortgages and prevented 
numerous costly and time-consuming reformation actions. 
B. Option One’s Lack of Due Diligence 
Although not explicitly addressed by the Business Bank court, 
the decision rendered in post-subprime-crisis 2009 reflects the 
general proposition that pre-bust lenders were irresponsible and 
 
 96. Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 36, at 10–11. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 11.  “By doing so, and then filing the mortgage, a mortgagee is able 
to compute the appropriate mortgage registry tax and provide notice to 
subsequent lienholders of the amount of indebtedness secured by the property.”  
Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 12. 
 102. Id. 
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often outright reckless in their lending practices.103  Had Option 
One adhered to sound lending practices, it likely would not have 
granted Hanson a mortgage in the first place. 
A mortgage lender reviewing a potential borrower’s 
application has two primary concerns: the status of the borrower 
and the status of the property.104  Important factors in determining 
the risk of lending to a potential borrower include the borrower’s 
employment history, his stability and progress in his job, and his 
credit history.105 
An investigation by Option One would have revealed that at 
the time the mortgage was executed, Hanson was a part-owner of 
an unprofitable pet store which he acquired exclusively on 
borrowed money.106  It would have also revealed that he was 
struggling to make payments on notes which he personally 
guaranteed.107  An evaluation conducted in a risk-averse and 
prudent manner would have cast much doubt upon the 
presumption that Hanson was capable of repaying such an 
enormous loan.108 
Option One’s suspicions would have further mounted 
following a proper investigation of the status of the property.  
Although even a good title searcher can miss liens, it is assumed 
that a proper title search would have uncovered two existing liens, 
totaling $1.08 million.109  As the third mortgagor on Hanson’s 
 
 103. See JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., THE STATE OF THE 
NATION’S HOUSING 16 (2007), available at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu
/publications/markets/son2007/son2007.pdf; Nick Timiraos, Hot Topic: The 
Subprime Market’s Rough Road, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2007, at A7, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB117167930652011972-pdK4yo0w_
TroFF5iEzgdlO0rug0_20070223.html?mod=blogs. 
 104. See D. BARLOW BURKE, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL MORTGAGE DOCUMENTS 105 
(1989); LEONARD P. VIDGER, BORROWING AND LENDING ON RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY 
99–107 (1981). 
 105. See BURKE, supra note 104, at 105; VIDGER, supra note 104, at 99–105. 
 106. See Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 286 (Minn. 2009) (“NAPD 
purchased U.S. Pet solely from the loan proceeds.”). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Nothing in the record indicates that Hanson had an additional source of 
income independent from his NAPD venture.  Assuming that is the case, his 
meager income derived from NAPD would likely be insufficient to make monthly 
payments on a combined $1.08 million debt owed to Chase Bank and Business 
Bank even before the third mortgage was executed.  The fact that Hanson 
consistently struggled to make payments and continually was forced to renegotiate 
his existing debts with Business Bank is strong evidence that he was in no shape to 
be undertaking additional obligations.  Id. 
 109. There was a $200,000 lien in favor of Business Bank, and an $880,000 lien 
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property, Option One would have known that two other companies 
would have priority over their mortgage.110  Again, a risk-averse 
lender would be very hesitant to lend on this property, as the first 
two liens would need to be satisfied before the third mortgagor 
could recover at a foreclosure sale.111 
The fact that Hanson did not properly disclose his liabilities to 
Option One112 is of little consequence.  Option One is deemed to 
have acquired constructive notice of the Business Bank mortgage,113 
as it was properly recorded fourteen months before Option One 
recorded its mortgage.114  Constructive notice is equivalent to actual 
notice of what appears on the face of the record to the party bound 
to search the record, whether or not the party actually has 
conducted a search.115  One who examines the records is 
chargeable with actual notice of all they contain.116  But, only a 
 
in favor of Chase Bank.  Id. at 287.  Business Bank’s failure to record the 
amendment to its mortgage until two weeks after Option One recorded is 
irrelevant.  Id.  As the court notes, the amount of debt that was secured by the 
mortgage cannot exceed $200,000.  Id. at 290.  The original mortgage was 
executed in the amount of $200,000 and was properly recorded about a year prior 
to Option One’s involvement with the property.  Id. at 287.  When Hanson sought 
to refinance his home in 2005, a title search would have revealed that Business 
Bank held a $200,000 second mortgage on Hanson’s home.  Id.  While a prompt 
recording of Business Bank’s modification would have nominally changed the 
amount of debt secured by the lien, the effect for purposes of notice was 
essentially identical.  The mortgage would still have secured only $200,000.  That 
Option One did not discover Business Bank’s interest at all suggests a prompt 
recording of the amendment would have made no difference whatsoever.  See id. 
 110. See Host v. Host, 497 N.W.2d 617, 619 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (“Generally, 
the rule applied to determine the priority of liens is ‘first in time is first in right.’” 
(quoting Gould v. City of St. Paul, 120 Minn. 172, 176, 139 N.W. 293, 294 (1913)). 
 111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 7.4 (1997) (“When the 
foreclosure sale price exceeds the amount of the mortgage obligation, the surplus 
is applied to liens and other interests terminated by the foreclosure in order of 
their priority . . . .”); 6 DEBTOR-CREDITOR LAW § 51.02(2)(b) (Theodore Eisenberg 
ed., Matthew Bender 2010) (“A junior mortgage is generally a second or third 
mortgage given on the same property.  It is legally subordinate to prior mortgages, 
and known to be such upon its making.”).  See generally DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MORTGAGES AND LIENS (2004) (helping lawyers advise clients 
on mortgages, liens, and other real estate issues). 
 112. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287 n.3. 
 113. See infra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
 114. See Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287. 
 115. See Bailey v. Galpin, 40 Minn. 319, 323, 41 N.W. 1054, 1055 (1889); 1 
JAMES D. OLSON, MINNESOTA RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE, § 6.08 (Matthew Bender 
2010). 
 116. See Normania Twp. v. Yellow Medicine Cnty., 205 Minn. 451, 458, 286 
N.W. 881, 885 (1939); Cable v. Minneapolis Stock Yards & Packing Co., 47 Minn. 
417, 422, 50 N.W. 528, 530 (1891); OLSON, supra note 115. 
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record that is sufficiently full and explicit to give the requisite 
information can act as constructive notice.117 
Nothing in the record indicates that the recording of Business 
Bank’s mortgage was improper, inadequate, or incomplete.118  
Although searching title is an inexact science, had Option One 
conducted a proper title search, it likely would have acquired 
actual knowledge of Business Bank’s mortgage.  The information 
was readily available, and would have been uncovered with 
adequate due diligence.  Therefore, Option One was charged with 
constructive notice of the Business Bank mortgage, rendering 
Hanson’s failure to disclose his obligation immaterial. 
Absent special circumstances, lenders and borrowers deal at 
arm’s length119 and thorough assessments must be made, especially 
when the amount of the prospective mortgage is large.  It follows 
that financial institutions and banks should be expected to do their 
homework.  Courts should not be expected to step in and grant 
careless companies relief, especially based upon statutory 
provisions that were drafted to generate revenue.120  By forcing 
Option One to bear the consequences of improperly investigating 
Hanson’s application and the title to his home, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court reinforces the proposition that companies who 
negligently or carelessly assess applicants do so at their own peril. 
C. Option One as a Key Player in the Subprime Crisis 
“Those of us who have looked to the self-interest of 
lending institutions to protect shareholders’ equity, myself 
included, are in a state of shocked disbelief.”—Alan 
Greenspan, Former Chairman of the Federal Reserve.121 
 
 
 
 117. See Roberts v. Grace, 16 Minn. 126, 134–36 (1870); OLSON, supra note 115. 
 118. See Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287. 
 119. See GERALD L. BLANCHARD, 1 LENDER LIABILITY: LAW, PRACTICE & 
PREVENTION, § 5:03 (2000). 
 120. See Engenmoen v. Lutroe, 153 Minn. 409, 412, 190 N.W. 894, 895–96 
(1922) (“The act is a revenue measure purely, and the only purpose of its 
prohibitive provisions is to compel the payment of the prescribed tax.  A 
mortgage, whatever its form, is not rendered void by failure to comply with the 
requirements of the statute . . . .”). 
 121. Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Error on Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 23, 2008, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/24/business
/economy/24panel.html. 
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Perhaps there is a reason why Option One conducted such a 
poor assessment of Hanson’s ability to repay the mortgage: because 
it simply did not care.  Option One engaged in a practice known as 
“originate-and-distribute,”122 where mortgage originators sold off 
their mortgages as soon as they were made.123  Because the 
mortgage lenders made money on the volume of loans originated 
and did not have to live with the credit consequences of the loans, 
their underwriting standards declined.124  The Minnesota Supreme 
Court may have considered this unsettling business model when 
ruling against Option One.125 
Mortgage originators such as Option One played a critical role 
in the recent crisis which nearly collapsed credit markets and 
deteriorated economic conditions.126  These originators granted 
mortgages to “subprime” borrowers.127  The term “subprime” refers 
to the credit characteristics of individual borrowers.128  Subprime 
borrowers typically have weakened credit histories that include 
payment delinquencies, and possibly more severe problems such as 
charge-offs, judgments, and bankruptcies.129  They may also display 
reduced repayment capacity as measured by credit scores, debt-to-
income ratios, or other criteria that may encompass borrowers with 
incomplete credit histories.130 
The mortgages granted to subprime borrowers allowed 
borrowers to finance and refinance their homes based on capital 
gains due to housing price appreciation and turn it into collateral 
 
 122. Steven L. Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets: Lessons from the Subprime 
Mortgage Meltdown, 93 MINN. L. REV. 373, 387 (2008). 
 123. See id. 
 124. Id.; see also Schwarcz, supra note 2, at 1319; Vikas Bajaj, A Cross-Country 
Blame Game, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2007, at C1, available at http://www.nytimes.com
/2007/05/08/business/worldbusiness/08iht-subprime.4.5623442.html. 
 125. This is not to suggest that Business Bank’s model was entirely flawless.  
Perhaps it should not have granted Hanson a loan in the first place.  One might 
also argue that it should not have continually afforded him so many opportunities 
to get his business off the ground. 
 126. See Brian J.M. Quinn, The Failure of Private Ordering and the Financial Crisis 
of 2008, 5 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 549 (2009), for a discussion of other factors that had a 
role in the crisis, such as cheap credit, credit default swaps, and deregulation of 
financial markets, which are not discussed here. 
 127. See Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Speech at Morehouse 
College: Four Questions about the Financial Crisis (Apr. 14, 2009), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090414a.htm. 
 128. Press Release, FDIC, Expanded Guidance for Subprime Lending 
Programs (Jan. 31, 2001), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2001/pr0901a.html. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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for a new mortgage.131  Borrowers also extracted this new equity for 
consumption.132  Essentially, an increase in the value of a home 
allowed owners to borrow additional funds regardless of whether 
existing debt had been paid down.133 
Because the originators had “little or no regard for whether 
the loans would be repaid[,]” they did whatever was necessary to 
have deals approved.134  “‘[N]o-doc’ loans, i.e., mortgages made 
without requiring any written verification of borrower income or 
assets,” accounted for forty-six percent of the subprime mortgage 
market in 2006.135  Lenders unnecessarily pushed even well-
qualified borrowers into subprime mortgages.136  Particularly in 
2005 and 2006 (Option One granted Hanson a mortgage in 
October 2005),137 “an environment [prevailed] where originators . . 
. misrepresented loan terms to borrowers, and borrowers [and] 
originators increasingly lied about borrowers’ income, property 
value, and other qualifications.”138  The objective was not to grant 
mortgages to those who could repay them, but rather to grant as 
many mortgages as possible.139 
Frederic Mishkin, an economist at Columbia Business School 
and a former member of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve, explained the effect of such a system: 
The originate-to-distribute model, unfortunately, created 
some severe incentive problems, which are referred to as 
principal-agent problems, or more simply as agency 
problems, in which the agent (the originator of the loans) 
did not have the incentives to act fully in the interest of 
the principal (the ultimate holder of the loan).  
Originators had every incentive to maintain origination 
volume, because that would allow them to earn substantial 
fees, but they had weak incentives to maintain loan 
 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 
617, 634 (2008). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 632 (“[S]ubprime mortgages have also resulted in billions of excess 
interest being paid by homeowners who could have qualified for prime rate 
mortgages.”). 
 137. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. 2009). 
 138. White, supra note 134, at 634. 
 139. See id. (“The ‘sell to distribute’ model created incentives for originators to 
deliver loan volume with little or no regard for whether loans would be repaid or 
foreclosed.”). 
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quality.140 
The investment institutions that purchased these loans would 
package them together with slivers of other mortgages and sell 
them as a safe investment, a process known as securitization.141  
These securities were customarily called mortgage-backed securities 
or collateralized debt obligations, and were sold off to outside 
investors.142  These securities were “backed by[,] and thus their 
payment derived principally or entirely from[,]  a mixed pool  of 
mortgage loans.”143  Investors bought the securities as “relatively 
safe (‘investment grade’) long-term investments that paid higher 
rates of return than similarly rated bonds.”144  However, the 
institutions that assembled and sold these securities faced the same 
incentive and moral hazard problems as the originators of the 
mortgages.145  Volume, not quality, was the main focus.146 
 
 
 140. Frederic Mishkin, Speech at the U.S. Monetary Policy Forum (Feb. 29, 
2008); see also Gary Gorton, The Panic of 2007 3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 14358, 2008), available at www.nber.org/papers/w14358 
(“[O]riginators and underwriters of loans no longer have an incentive to pay 
attention to the risk of the loans they originate, since they are not residual 
claimants on these loans. . . . All major bank regulators and central bankers appear 
to subscribe to this view . . . .”). 
 141. See Schwarcz, Protecting Financial Markets, supra note 122, at 376.  This is 
not to suggest that securitization does not serve a useful purpose in the world of 
finance.  “Securitization efficiently allocates risk with capital[,] . . . enables 
companies to access capital markets directly . . . at low[] cost . . . , and . . . avoids 
middleman inefficiencies.”  See Schwarcz, The Future of Securitization, supra note 2, 
at 1315; see also Alan S. Blinder, Six Fingers of Blame in the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 30, 2007, § 3, at 4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30
/business/30view.html (“Securitization is a marvelous thing.  It has lubricated the 
market and made mortgages more affordable.  We certainly don’t want it to 
end.”). 
 142. See Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 376. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Houman B. Shadab, Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4 
ENTREPREN. BUS. L.J. 407, 413 (2010) (citing JANET M. TAVAKOLI, STRUCTURED 
FINANCE & COLLATERALIZED DEBT OBLIGATIONS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CASH AND 
SYNTHETIC SECURITIZATION 331–54, 405–27 (2d ed. 2008)). 
 145. John Kiff & Paul Mills, Money for Nothing and Checks for Free: Recent 
Developments in U.S. Subprime Mortgage Markets 8 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working 
Paper No. WP/07/188, 2007) (“Safeguards ensuring prudent lending were 
weakened by the combination of fee-driven remuneration at each stage of the 
securitization process and the dispersion of credit risk which weakened 
monitoring incentives. Hence, intermediaries were remunerated primarily by 
generating loan volume rather than quality, even as the credit spreads on the 
resulting securities shrank.”). 
 146. Id. 
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The securitization process was profitable and demand for the 
securities increased.147  At their peak, subprime mortgages were 
being securitized at the rate of $100 billion per quarter.148  
However, “the transactions were so complex that many investors 
could not understand them.”149  “The prospectus itself in a typical 
[collateralized debt obligation security] can be hundreds of pages 
long.”150  “Investors placed too much faith in ratings agencies” who 
failed to properly disclose the risks associated with these 
securities.151  U.S. regulators also failed to protect investors and 
consumers.152  In buying and selling securities which they could not 
properly value, investors exposed themselves to a large amount of 
uncertainty and risk.153 
Ultimately, the system unraveled when home values declined 
and “investors took large losses as mortgage-related assets were 
marked down in anticipation of high defaults.”154  “By the third 
quarter of 2007, 24% of all subprime loans . . . were either 
 
 147. Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Crisis 31–
32 (Dec. 5, 2008) (working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1020396.  
Accordingly, the subprime share of the mortgage market increased sharply (from 
around 8% in 2001 to 20% in 2006) along with the securitized share of the 
subprime mortgage market (from 54% in 2001 to 75% in 2006).  Id. 
 148. White, supra note 134, at 618. 
 149. Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 383; see also Aaron Lucchetti & Serena Ng, 
Credit & Blame: How Rating Firms’ Calls Fueled Subprime Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 
2007, at A10, available at http://www.homepage.villanova.edu/shawn.howton/Fin
%202227/articles/subprimemess.pdf (quoting Edward Grebeck, chief executive of 
a debt-strategy firm called Tempus Advisors, who stated, “A lot of institutional 
investors bought [mortgage-backed] securities substantially based on their ratings 
[without fully understanding what they bought], in part because the market has 
become so complex.”). 
 150. Schwarcz, supra note 122, at 383. 
 151. Blinder, supra note 141, at 4.  Some suggest that rating agencies had 
incentive problems of their own.  “Under the current system, they are hired and 
paid by the issuers of the very security they rate . . . .”  Id.  But see Schwarcz, supra 
note 122, at 401 (“[T]he reputational cost of a bad rating usually far exceeds the 
income received by giving the rating.”). 
 152. See White, supra note 134, at 618 (U.S. regulators failed to protect either 
investors or consumers in the fragmentation of mortgage underwriting, 
origination, servicing and investment as a result of securitization). 
 153. See Donald R. van Deventer, Fair-Value Accounting, CDOs and the Credit 
Crisis of 2007–2008: Complexity and Model Risk in the Collateralized Debt Obligation 
Market Are Severe, BANK ACCOUNTING & FINANCE 3, 4 (2008) (“One of the most 
important rules of financial markets is that ‘if you can’t value a security, don’t buy 
it and don’t sell it, because you will be taken advantage of if you do.’  This critical 
but often ignored maxim will be ignored no longer . . . .”). 
 154. See Mishkin, supra note 140. 
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delinquent or in foreclosure.”155  “Investors realized that they were 
sadly mistaken regarding their assumption that [mortgage-backed 
securities] with high credit ratings embodied very little risk.”156  
Families lost their homes, municipal tax bases were depleted, and 
crime rose.157  Even renters were indirectly affected by the crisis.158 
Option One was a major player in the subprime market, and 
thus, the subprime crisis.159  Based on market share as of March 31, 
2007 (just as problems in the subprime market began to show),160 
Option One was the fourth largest originator of subprime 
mortgages in the entire country.161 
According to the annual report of H&R Block, which owned 
Option One during both the Business Bank dispute and the 
subprime crisis, Option One’s primary business was the origination 
and securitization of subprime mortgages.162  In fiscal years 2005 
through 2007, Option One originated $98.9 billion in subprime 
mortgage loans.163  Its typical borrowers were those with limited 
income documentation, high levels of consumer debt, or past 
credit problems.164  In 2005, the year Hanson’s mortgage to Option 
One was executed, 38.1% of its borrowers simply stated their 
income and provided no documentation.165  Option One 
securitized the mortgages it wrote, selling substantially all of its 
 
 155. White, supra note 134, at 618 (citation omitted). 
 156. Mishkin, supra note 140. 
 157. White, supra note 134, at 631–32.  “Studies . . . have tabulated the 
devastating cost to entire neighborhoods and cities of the subprime foreclosure 
tidal wave.  In addition to the loss in property values to neighborhoods, subprime 
foreclosures are taxing municipal resources, undermining the property tax base, 
burdening already-burdened social service providers, and increasing crime.”  Id. 
 158. Vicki Been & Allegra Glashausser, Tenants: Innocent Victims of the Nation’s 
Foreclosure Crisis, 2 ALBANY GOV’T L. REV. 1, 2 (2009) (“Renters are innocent victims 
of the foreclosure crisis, losing their homes through no fault of their own when 
their landlord goes into foreclosure.”). 
 159. See generally Navid Vazire, Flawed Institutions and Markets: From the Savings 
& Loan Debacle Forward: Smoke and Mirrors: Predatory Lending and the Subprime 
Mortgage Loan Securitization Pyramid Scheme, 30 PACE L. REV. 41, 41–45 (2009) 
(explaining the role of subprime mortgage originators in the subprime financial 
crisis). 
 160. New Century Financial, the country’s largest subprime lender, filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy only two days later.  See New Century Files for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy, CNNMONEY.COM, Apr. 3, 2007, http://money.cnn.com/2007/04/02
/news/companies/new_century_bankruptcy. 
 161. H&R Block Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 10 (June 29, 2007). 
 162. Id. at 8. 
 163. Id. at 9. 
 164. Id. at 8. 
 165. Id. at 9. 
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subprime mortgages on a daily basis.166 
Predictably, Option One came crashing down during the crisis 
it helped create.  In fiscal year 2007, Option One generated a pre-
tax loss in excess of $1.2 billion.167  In early 2008, it was estimated 
that it had accrued over $700 million in debt.168  Option One was 
eventually acquired by WL Ross, Inc., a company specializing in 
improving the financial situation of distressed businesses.169 
Option One granted Hanson his mortgage in the fall of 
2005,170 a time when home prices peaked around the country.171  
Based on its business model, it is unlikely that Option One cared 
about Hanson’s ability to repay the mortgage.  Hanson could easily 
have been classified as a subprime borrower since the business he 
operated was losing money and his debt-to-income ratios were 
presumably very high.172  However, this was likely of little to no 
significance to Option One, as it was only concerned with getting 
the mortgage on the books and immediately selling it to investors. 
Option One embodied the exact type of business which has 
received so much blame after the instigators of the crisis were 
revealed.  Screening and monitoring borrowers is a costly process,173 
so Option One decided to cut corners.  It did shoddy research 
before granting an enormous mortgage and had little regard for 
the credit consequences of the loan.  By rejecting Option One’s 
attempt to invalidate a prior mortgage, the supreme court forced it 
to live with such consequences. 
 
 166. Id. at 10.  However, the practice of selling a mortgage on the secondary 
market the very day of closing is not uncommon and has existed for decades.  See 
Sandra R. Bullington, The Role of the Secondary Mortgage Market, in 4B REAL ESTATE 
FINANCING § 2L.01 (Patrick J. Rohan ed., 2008). 
 167. H&R Block Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 29 (June 29, 2007). 
 168. Glenn Setzer, Big Losses for PMI Company and HR Block Unloads Option One, 
MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY, Mar. 17, 2008, available at http://www.mortgagenewsdaily
.com/3172008_Option_One.asp. 
 169. HOOVER’S COMPANY RECORDS, WL ROSS & CO. LLC (2010), 
http://www.hoovers.com/company/WL_Ross__Co_LLC/rctkjif-1.html. 
 170. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 287 (Minn. 2009). 
 171. Rick Brooks & Constance Mitchell Ford, The United States of Subprime, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 11, 2007, at A1, available at http://online.wsj.com/public/article
/SB119205925519455321.html. 
 172. See Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 287. 
 173. Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the 
Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit 2 (Working Paper, Oct. 24, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290312. 
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D. Freedom to Contract Ultimately Prevails 
The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision upheld the greater 
interest of freedom to contract.  Freedom to contract for lawful 
purposes with whomever a party pleases remains one of the most 
fundamental interests of the judicial system.174  People should have 
the freedom “to make arrangements that suit their individual 
interests.”175  Efficiency theorists worry a great deal about 
limitations on freedom to contract.176  This public policy has been 
cited as a dominant factor when weighing the enforceability of 
certain contractual provisions.177 
Hanson entered into an agreement with Business Bank, and 
the contractual terms of their agreement ultimately prevailed.178  
Hanson was provided with numerous opportunities to get his 
business off the ground,179 and Business Bank was able to secure a 
portion of Hanson’s substantial debt to a tangible asset.180  In 
consideration for additional fees, Hanson was afforded additional 
time and money to make his business profitable.181  Both parties 
eventually received what they desired. 
Option One did not contract with Hanson until over a year 
later,182 and, accordingly, Business Bank had seniority in lien 
priority.183 
 
 174. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 5 (5th ed. 
2003) (“[T]he parties’ power to contract as they please for lawful purposes 
remains a basic principle of our legal system.”). 
 175. Joseph William Singer, Essay, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and 
Democratic Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1028 (2009). 
 176. Id. at 1034. 
 177. See Rossman v. 740 River Drive, 308 Minn. 134, 136–37, 241 N.W.2d 91, 92 
(1976) (remanding to determine whether the public policy of freedom to contract 
regarding the presence of an exculpatory clause in a lease was outweighed by 
public policy of the landlord assuming certain duties); see also Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 
877 v. Loberg Plumbing & Heating Co., 266 Minn. 426, 434, 123 N.W.2d 793, 799 
(1963) (holding courts must enforce declared purpose of contract, if within lawful 
scope of contractual objectives); James Quirk Milling Co. v. Minneapolis & St. 
Louis R.R. Co., 98 Minn. 22, 23, 107 N.W. 742, 742 (1906) (proclaiming it public 
policy that freedom to contract remain inviolate except only in cases which 
contravene some principle which is of even more importance). 
 178. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, 769 N.W.2d 285, 290 (Minn. 2009). 
 179. Id. at 286–87. 
 180. Id. at 287. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. See Timeline, LLC v. Williams Holdings No. 3, LLC, 698 N.W.2d 181, 185 
n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (“Seniority is usually determined by the chronological 
order in which liens or mortgages are recorded.”). 
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The decision is consistent with a principle articulated by the 
court over seventy years ago: “[c]ourts should not, nor do they, 
look for excuses or loopholes to avoid contracts fairly and 
deliberately made whether such be by individuals or 
corporations.”184  The freedom to contract is protected by both the 
state and federal constitutions185 and in refusing to invalidate a fair 
and deliberate contract, the court protected that right.186 
The supreme court’s ruling also protected the reasonable 
expectations of the parties who entered into a bargain.  In doing 
so, the court moved to promote and facilitate business 
agreements.187  Such agreements assist the division of labor, goods 
find their way to the places where they are most needed, and 
economic activity is generally stimulated.188  Parties who sign 
documents must be held liable, otherwise, such documents “would 
be entirely worthless and chaos would prevail in our business 
relations.”189  If a business person knew that obstacles could 
potentially stand in the way of judicial relief, she would be hesitant 
to rely on a promise where the legal sanction was of significance to 
 
 184. Equitable Holding Co. v. Equitable Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 202 Minn. 529, 
535, 279 N.W. 736, 740 (1938). 
 185. Fed. Distillers, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 28, 45, 229 N.W.2d 144, 157 (1975) 
(“The freedom to contract with respect to one’s property and in the conduct of a 
lawful business to select the party with whom one chooses to do so is a part of the 
liberty protected by the due process clauses of the State and Federal 
Constitutions.”). 
 186. This is not to suggest that this principle is without limits.  See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 3.1 cmt. d (1997) (“[I]t may, in rare 
instances, be desirable to protect residential and small business loan mortgagors, 
whether in default or not, from inequitable attempts by mortgagees to profit by 
acquiring appreciated and improved real estate by means of option exercise.  Such 
mortgagors are apt to be unrepresented by counsel and to be less sophisticated 
negotiators than their large business counterparts.  Consequently, close judicial 
scrutiny in such situations may be justified. . . .  It is preferable for courts to deal 
with such situations by use of their inherent discretion to deny equitable relief 
under harsh and inequitable circumstances.”) 
 187. See, e.g., Starlite Ltd. P’ship v. Landry’s Rest., Inc., 780 N.W.2d 396, 398 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (“Enforcement of a contract’s legal obligations in a way that 
is consistent with the parties’ stated expectations provides certainty and 
predictability in contractual relationships.”); see also 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, 
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1993) (discussing 
purpose of contract law). 
 188. Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract 
Damages: 1, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 61 (1936). 
 189. Currie State Bank v. Schmitz, 628 N.W.2d 205, 210 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) 
(quoting Watkins Prod., Inc. v. Butterfield, 274 Minn. 378, 380, 144 N.W. 56, 58 
(1966)). 
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her.190  The decision rendered by the court helps to ease such 
hesitance in the minds of business people. 
E. Legislature Amends Statute to Reflect Decision 
Less than a year after the supreme court ruling, the Minnesota 
Legislature amended section 287.03.191  These amendments, 
effective July 1, 2010,192 essentially codify the Business Bank decision.  
They also attempt to reduce the detrimental impact of the court of 
appeals’ ruling, which would have invalidated mortgages with very 
broad debt descriptions entirely. 
The language “shall be valid” was replaced by “may be 
enforced.”193  The legislature also deleted “the initial known 
amount of the debt.”194  Presumably, this amendment will no longer 
permit parties like Option One to argue that a mortgage should be 
completely invalidated because of minor non-compliance with the 
Mortgage Registry Tax statute.  The deletion of the harsh language, 
which led the court of appeals to rule in favor of Option One,195 
should lead to results more consistent with the legislative intent of 
the statute.196  This is also in harmony with the Minnesota State Bar 
 
 190. See Fuller, supra note 188, at 62. 
 191. H.F.  2828, 2009-2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010).  The statue now 
reads as follows:  
No instrument, other than a decree of marriage dissolution or an 
instrument made pursuant to it, relating to real estate may be enforced as 
security for any debt, unless the fact that it is so intended is expressed in 
it.  Except as provided in section 287.05, an instrument may not be 
enforced as security for a debt amount in excess of: (1) the initial known 
amount of the debt expressed in the instrument if the instrument secures 
that entire debt amount; or (2) the portion of the initial known amount 
of the debt expressed in the instrument if the instrument secures only a 
portion of that debt amount. 
Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. 
 195. Bus. Bank v. Hanson, No. 27-CV-06-14599, 2008 Minn. Ct. App. LEXIS 
1282, at *23 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 28, 2008) (“[T]he express language of section 
287.03 plainly states that a mortgage is invalid if it does not state the total amount 
of debt.”) (emphasis added). 
 196. See First State Bank of Boyd v. Hayden, 121 Minn. 45, 50, 140 N.W. 132, 
134 (1913) (“The statute is purely a revenue measure, and nothing therein to 
indicate that it was the legislative intent to declare instruments void for 
noncompliance therewith.”); Engenmoen, 153 Minn. at 412, 190 N.W. at 895–96 
(“The act is a revenue measure purely, and the only purpose of its prohibitive 
provisions is to compel the payment of the prescribed tax.”). 
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Association’s contention that the statute should not be used as 
means to invalidate or subordinate mortgages.197 
The legislature also added a direct reference to section 
287.05,198 which reads: 
When the real property identified in a mortgage . . . is 
intended to secure only a portion of a debt amount 
recited or referred to in the mortgage, the mortgage may 
contain the following statement, or its equivalent on the 
first page: “Notwithstanding anything to the contrary 
herein, enforcement of this mortgage is limited to a debt 
amount of $____ under chapter 287 of Minnesota 
Statutes.”199 
The amendment expressly provides that a party is permitted to 
do exactly as Business Bank did: a mortgage may secure a larger 
debt, but the amount effective as security is limited to that 
expressed in the instrument.200  This amendment is consistent with 
nearly a century’s worth of practice and precedent.201 
The supreme court, however, was unable to correct all of the 
problems created by the court of appeals’ decision because of the 
narrow scope of the Business Bank decision.  While section 287.05 
deals with mortgages with contractual debt limits, the supreme 
court did not, and possibly could not, address mortgages with very 
broad debt descriptions.  Minnesota law after the court of appeals 
decision prohibited a legal instrument relating to real estate from 
being used as security for a debt unless the instrument specifically 
stated that it was intended to be used in that way.202  The statutory 
amendment was aimed to fix this problem.203 
By amending the statute to codify the Business Bank decision, 
the Minnesota Legislature wholeheartedly endorsed the supreme 
court’s ruling and attempted to cure harm created by the court of 
appeals decision. 
 
 
 197. Brief for Minn. State Bar Ass’n, supra note 36, at 2–3. 
 198. H.F. 2828, 2009-2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010). 
 199. MINN. STAT. § 287.05, subdiv. 1a(a) (2008). 
 200. H.F. 2828, 2009-2010 Leg., 86th Sess. (Minn. 2010). 
 201. See supra Part II. 
 202. See MINN. H. REP., B. SUMMARY, H.F. 2828 (2010), available at 
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/bs/86/HF2828.html. 
 203. Id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
By ruling in favor of Business Bank, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court upheld the validity of a mortgage in compliance with the 
Mortgage Registry Tax statute.204  However, the court specifically 
declined to address the question of whether a mortgage that does 
not comply with the statute is invalid as a matter of law.205  The 
answer to such a question is difficult to predict since strong policies 
support a finding either way.  The purpose of the statute is to 
produce revenue, not invalidate mortgages, but a lax attitude 
regarding compliance with the statute may frustrate its true 
purpose and result in a downturn in revenue. 
The Business Bank decision reinforced the principles made 
clear by the subprime mortgage crisis: lenders must exercise due 
diligence and grant mortgages only to those capable of repaying 
them.  As evidenced by this decision, Minnesota courts will have 
little sympathy for those who make reckless and regrettable 
decisions. 
 
 204. Bus. Bank, 769 N.W.2d at 290. 
 205. Id. at 290 n.8. 
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